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On Tuesday, June 29, 2010, the Supreme Court officially concluded its
fifth year with John Roberts as Chief Justice, its first year with Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, and its thirty-fifth and final year with Justice John Paul
Stevens on the bench.' In this essay, I want to assess the Roberts Court's
approach to criminal procedure.
I make five major points. First, the dramatic downsizing of the
Court's docket has reduced the number of criminal procedure cases.
Second, in the area of criminal procedure, like in all areas, it is the Anthony
Kennedy Court. Third, precedent and stare decisis are given little weight
by the Roberts Court; it is a Court quite willing to change the law, including
dramatic changes to the law. Fourth, overall, it is a quite conservative
Court in the area of criminal procedure, but there are dramatic exceptions to
this conclusion. Fifth, the Obama presidency is unlikely to change the
overall ideology of the Roberts Court.
I. THE SHRINKING DOCKET
In October Term 2009, the Supreme Court decided seventy-three cases
2
after briefing and oral argument. Compare this to the seventy-five cases
t Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
This essay is based on a speech given at the criminal procedure symposium at Texas Tech Law School
in April 2010. It was updated based on developments at the end of the Supreme Court's term.
1. See Robert Barnes, Roberts Led Supreme Court Through Assertive Term, WASH. POST, June
30, 2010, at A03.
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
2. See, e.g., 2009 Term Opinions of the Courts, SUPREME
9
visited Oct. 12, 2010). There
(last
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspxTerm0
were also fourteen per curium decisions-cases decided without briefing or oral argument and based on
the petition for certiorari and the opposition to the petition for certiorari. See id This is a disturbing
development because the Court is deciding cases without giving lawyers any chance to argue them.
There is an enormous difference between a petition for a certiorari (or an opposition) and a brief on the
merits of the case.
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that the Court decided the year before, the sixty-seven cases decided the
term prior to that, or the sixty-eight cases the year before that.3
To put this in historical perspective, for much of the 20th century, the
Court was deciding over 200 cases a year.4 In the 1980s, the Court was
averaging over 150 decisions a year. As recently as October Term 1991,
the Court issued 107 signed opinions.6 At his confirmation hearings in
2005, John Roberts said that he would like to see an increase in the size of
the docket. Exactly the opposite has occurred. In the last year of the
Rehnquist Court, October Term 2004, the Court decided seventy-eight
cases.8 The Roberts Court has yet to equal that number.9
This trend has enormous implications for lawyers, judges, and the
nation. More major legal questions must wait a longer time before being
settled. More conflicts among the circuits and the states go a longer time
before being resolved. Obtaining certiorari has always been difficult, but
now it is even harder. This is true in the area of criminal procedure, as well
as all other areas of law.
One of the most disturbing aspects of the smaller docket is the increase
in the length of the decisions. As the number of cases has gone down, the
average length of opinions has gone up. In October Term 2009, the
decision in Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission was 183 pages
long.10 But, that is nothing compared to the ruling in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, which applied the Second Amendment to state and local
governments and was 214 pages long."
One of the things I must do every summer is edit annual supplements
to my constitutional law and criminal procedure casebooks. 2 There is
simply no way to edit a 183-page or a 214-page opinion into an assignment
manageable for law students in one night without making a hash of it. So, I

3. These statistics are based on my computation. Inevitably, there are differences in counting
among those who do so. For example, Thomas Goldstein does not count Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), as part of the October 2009 Term statistics, even though it
was decided in January 2010, because it was argued before the start of the term. See Case Files:
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission/ (published by Thomas Goldstein) (last visited
Nov. 8,2010). I do include it because it was decided in the midst of the term.
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2007 Supreme Court Term, 25 TOURO L.
REV. 541, 541 (2009).
5. See id
6. See Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7,2006, at Al.
7. Id
8. Id.
9. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
10. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
I1. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3020-136 (2010).
12. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY &
LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2008).
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am starting a new campaign: word and page limits should be imposed on
Supreme Court opinions.
II. IT'S THE ANTHONY KENNEDY COURT

Out of tradition and deference to the Chief, the Supreme Court is
referred to as the Roberts Court. But, at least for lawyers who write briefs
to the Court and stand before the justices, it is the Kennedy Court. In each
of the five years of the Roberts Court, Kennedy has been in the majority in
more 5-4 decisions than any other justice. 13 In October Term 2009, there
were seventeen 5-4 decisions, and Justice Kennedy was in the majority in
thirteen. The year before, when there were twenty-three 5-4 decisions,
Justice Kennedy was in the majority in eighteen.
Therefore, it is possible to get the clearest sense of the overall ideology
of the Court by focusing on the 5-4 decisions where the Court is
ideologically divided. During October Term 2009, there were twelve cases
where the Court divided along ideological lines-with Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito on one side and Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor on the other. Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives in
nine cases and with the liberals in three. The year before, there were
sixteen cases divided along traditional ideological lines (with the four
liberals being Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). Justice Kennedy was
with the conservatives in eleven and the liberals in five. Overall, for the
five years of the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy has sided twice as much
with the conservatives than with the liberals.
As explained below, this has been true in some of the most important
changes in criminal procedure during the Roberts Court: lessening the
protection of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; cutting back
on the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; and
attacking the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment.
III. PRECEDENT
There is a stunning lack of regard for precedent on the Roberts Court.
This was particularly evident in the Court's decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, which declared unconstitutional a key
provision of the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform
Act of 2001 and held that corporations can spend unlimited amounts of
14
The Court
money in independent expenditures in election campaigns.
overruled its decision from seven years earlier in McConnell v. Federal

13.
14.

See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 884-86.
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Election Commission.15 What changed in seven years? Did the Court find
some musty history of the First Amendment that led it to believe that it had
made a mistake earlier? Of course not-the only difference was that Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor had been in the majority in McConnell and she had
been replaced by Justice Samuel Alito, who was the fifth vote to overrule
the precedent and strike down the restriction on campaign expenditures by
corporations in Citizens United.'6
The willingness to overrule precedent is evident in the area of criminal
procedure as well. In Montejo v. Louisiana, the Court expressly overruled
Michigan v. Jackson in a 5-4 decision, holding that police are not barred by
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel from attempting to elicit
incriminating statements from a criminal defendant who has been appointed
an attorney.17
Montejo was arraigned for murder in Louisiana, and an attorney was
appointed for him at the arraignment. 8 Subsequently, the police took him
to the murder scene and asked him to write a letter of apology to the
victim's widow.19 Prosecutors attempted to use incriminating statements
from the letter at the trial. 20 Defense counsel objected that the letter was
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment because police elicited it
without counsel's presence.2'
Justice Scalia, writing for the conservative majority, found that there
was no Sixth Amendment violation.22 The Court concluded that the
appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not preclude
subsequent efforts by the police to elicit incriminating statements.2 3 The
Court did, however, emphasize that Arizona v. Edwards remains the law,
and once a criminal suspect invokes the right to counsel pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona under the Fifth Amendment, the police cannot attempt
to elicit incriminating statements without counsel's presence.24 But, for
suspects who waive their right to counsel under Miranda,there is nothing to

15. Id. at 915.
16. Compare id. at 886 (reaching its holding with Justice Samuel Alito in the majority), with
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 113 (2003) (reaching its holding with Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor in the majority).
17. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009).
18. Id. at 2082.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 2092.
23. Id. at 2091.
24. Id.; see also Arizona v. Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (holding that, once the accused has
exercised his right to have counsel present during interrogation, police cannot attempt to elicit
incriminating statements the next day, in the absence of counsel, unless the accused initiates the
communication).
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keep police from attempting to elicit incriminating statements even when
they have an attorney.25
Ironically, the Court was quite willing to cut back on Edwards as soon
as it had the chance. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court held that the
protections of Edwards expire after fourteen days.26 Shatzer was in prison
27
for other offenses when police questioned him about molesting his child.
Shatzer invoked his right to counsel and police properly stopped
questioning him.28 Three years later, Shatzer was still incarcerated and
29
police once more sought to interrogate him about the child molestation.
Police gave Shatzer his Miranda warnings, Shatzer waived them and made
incriminating statements.30 The issue was whether his earlier invocation of
his right to counsel precluded this subsequent attempt at questioning
31
without an attorney being present.
The Supreme Court ruled against Shatzer with Justice Scalia writing
for a Court that was unanimous as to the result.32 Justice Scalia explained
that there must be a time at which the protections of Edwards expire.33 The
Court concluded that fourteen days was the appropriate time period.34 In
other words, after a suspect invokes the right to counsel under Miranda, the
police cannot attempt to elicit incriminating statements for fourteen days.35
Although, of course, there is no fourteen-day clause in the Constitution,
Justice Scalia explained that this was a place where there was a need for a
bright-line rule and that it was appropriate for the Court to create one as a
limit on a Court-created protection.
The fourteen-day rule is arbitrary in that it invites police
circumvention because police simply will wait two weeks after a suspect
invokes the right to counsel before trying again to elicit incriminating
statements. Also, it is notable that Shatzer was never actually released from
custody between the questioning; he was just returned to the general prison
population. 7 The Court, though, found that this was sufficient to end the
"in-custodial interrogation" and to make the resultant incriminating
statements admissible.38 I doubt that any prisoner on the planet would

25. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.
26. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1226 (2010).
27. Id at 1217.
28. Id
29. See id. at 1218.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1217.
33. Id. at 1226.
34. Id
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1217.
38. Id.
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agree that Shatzer had been released from "custody" since he remained in
prison the entire time.
Another example of the Court's willingness to depart from precedent
in the area of criminal procedure was one of the most important criminal
procedure decisions of October Term 2009. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the
Supreme Court took a major step to lessening the Constitution's protection
against self-incrimination. 3 9 The Supreme Court held that a criminal
suspect's silence, even for a period of hours, is not enough to invoke the
right to remain silent.4 0 Even a single word after hours of silence is enough
to waive this right.4 '
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court described the inherently
coercive nature of in-custodial interrogation and held that, to lessen this
coercion, suspects must be informed of their rights.42 Even children can
recite the famous Miranda warnings that include informing a suspect of his
or her right to remain silent.
Van Chester Thompkins was arrested by Michigan police on suspicion
of having committed murder.43 He was given his Miranda warnings and
was then asked to sign a statement that he understood them.44 He refused. 4 5
There is a factual dispute as to whether he orally indicated his
understanding.46
Police officers questioned Thompkins for two hours and forty-five
minutes.4 7 Thompkins remained almost entirely silent during this time.48
Occasionally he would answer a question with a single word or a nod.49
Almost three hours into the interrogation, the police officer asked
Thompkins, "'Do you believe in God?"' 50 Thompkins said yes.5' The
officer then asked Thompkins whether he prays to God-once more he said
yes.52 The officer then asked, "'Do you pray to God to forgive you for
shooting that boy down?"'s 3 Thompkins again said yes.54
This statement was admitted against Thompkins at trial and was
crucial evidence in gaining his conviction. 5 The issue before the Supreme
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2273 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2268.
See id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id. at 2256.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2257.
Id. at 2256.
Id. at 2256-57.
Id. at 2257 (quoting App. at 11a, 153a).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting App. at 153a).
Id.
Id. at 2257-58.
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Court was whether this violated the privilege against self-incrimination.s5
In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled against Thompkins and found that there
was no infringement of his Fifth Amendment rights. 57 Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and
8
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito.
The Court concluded that a suspect's silence is not sufficient to invoke
the right to remain silent. 9 Rather, the Court said that there must be an
"unambiguous" invocation of this right.60 Earlier, in Davis v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that an invocation of the right to counsel under
61
Miranda must be done in a clear and unambiguous manner. The Court
62
ruled that the same is true of the right to remain silent.
The Court then found that Thompkins had validly waived his right to
remain silent. 63 The Court said that the waiver of this right need not be
explicit.64 It said that "[a]n implicit waiver of the 'right to remain silent' is
65
sufficient to admit a suspect's statement into evidence." The Court thus
6
upheld Thompkins's conviction.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a vehement dissent joined by Justices
She accused the majority of turning
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Miranda on its head and lamented the irony that silence is not sufficient to
invoke the right to remain silent.
It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis
v. Thompkins with Miranda v. Arizona.69 This is yet another example, and
there have been many, of the Roberts Court's lack of concern with
precedent and stare decisis. In Miranda, the Court said that "[i]f [an]
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination."7 0 But, in Thompkins, the Court said that the government

56. Id. at 2259-60.
57. Id. at 2265.
58. Id. at 2255.
59. Id. at 2260.
60. Id.
61. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,460 (1994).
62. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
63. Id. at 2262.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2261 (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 376 (1979)).
66. Id. at 2265.
67. See id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 2278.
69. Compare id. (creating a presumption that confessions are admissible after questioning so long
as there has been an explicit invocation of the right to remain silent), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (creating a strong presumption that confessions are inadmissible if obtained after questioning).
70. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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need not show a knowing and intelligent waiver in order to find a suspect's
statements admissible.
In Miranda,the Court stated the following:
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an
accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration
before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not
validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual
eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the
compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is
inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the
privilege. 72
Under this analysis, Thompkins's incriminating statements should have
been excluded.
Nor is it consistent with the right to remain silent to hold that silence is
insufficient and that a defendant must specifically say that he or she is
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Few suspects realistically
will have the knowledge to recite these magic words. After Berghuis v.
Thompkins, police can keep questioning a silent suspect for hours and hours
until they finally obtain an incriminating answer. 74
Miranda created a strong presumption that confessions are
inadmissible if obtained after questioning unless there has been an explicit
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
In
sharp contrast, Berghuis v. Thompkins creates a strong presumption that
confessions are admissible if obtained after questioning unless there has
been an explicit invocation of the right to remain silent.76 This really does
turn Miranda on its head.
Ultimately, the underlying issue is whether Miranda matters. Miranda
was based on great concern about the inherent coercion that exists when
suspects are subjected to in-custody police interrogation.n The Supreme
Court has explained that Miranda reflects our society's "preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice" and a
"fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses."7
It is based on a realization that the "privilege,
while sometimes a 'shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection of the
innocent."' 79 In 2000, in Dickerson v. United States, the Court, in a 7-2
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 476.
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270-71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id.at 2274-75.
See Miranda,384 U.S. at 475.
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
Withthow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1983).
Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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80
decision, reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona. But, the Court's decision in
Berghuis v. Thompkins shows the hollowness of this commitment. As
Justice Sotomayor observed in her dissent, "Today's decision bodes poorly
for the fundamental principles that Mirandaprotects."'

IV. A CONSERVATIVE COURT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH DRAMATIC
EXCEPTIONS
82
There is no doubt that overall the Roberts Court is conservative. As
explained earlier, Justice Kennedy sides with the conservatives more than
twice as often as with the liberals in cases where the Court is ideologically
divided."
The conservativism of the Roberts Court in criminal procedure is
especially evident in its significant lessening of the protections of the
exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment. The Court initially
84
signaled the shift in 2006 with Hudson v. Michigan.
For many years, the Supreme Court has held that the police usually
must knock and announce their presence before entering a residence.
Hudson involved a situation where all of the justices, and all of the judges
The
in the lower courts, agreed that police violated this requirement.
suppressed.
be
to
had
gained
evidence
question was whether the
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the exclusionary rule does not apply
when police violate the Fourth Amendment's requirement for knock and
announce.8 8 Justice Scalia's opinion called into question the very existence
of the exclusionary rule. 89 He referred to it as a "last resort" and stressed
the great costs of the exclusionary rule in terms of suppressing important
90
evidence and potentially allowing dangerous people to go free. He argued
that the exclusionary rule is unnecessary because of the availability of civil
suits against the police and the increased professionalization of police
forces. 9 ' Justice Scalia's arguments were not about an exception to the
Fourth Amendment in knock-and-announce cases; they were the arguments

80. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000).
81. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
82. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply Right, 12 GREEN BAG 413,
413-14 (2009).
83. See supra Part II.
84. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006).
85. See id. at 589.
86. Id. at 602.
87. Id. at 590.
88. Id. at 602.
89. Id.at 599.
90. Id.at 591.
91. Id. at 597.
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that conservatives have made for decades against the existence of the
exclusionary rule.92
After Hudson, there is no reason for police ever to meet the Fourth
Amendment's requirements for knocking and announcing before entering a
dwelling. Police know that there will be no consequences to violating this
rule. Justice Scalia mentioned the possibility of civil suits against police
officers as an alternative to suppressing the evidence.93 Such suits, though,
rarely will be successfully brought. It is difficult for individuals to obtain
attorneys willing to bring such cases because there is little chance of
enough damages to make it worth it to sue. Juries are far more likely to be
sympathetic to police officers, especially when their actions succeeded in
gaining evidence of illegal activities. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
made it almost impossible to sue cities for such violations and has made it
difficult to sue police officers by providing them immunity to many suits
for civil rights violations.
In a separate opinion, Justice Kennedy said "the continued operation
of the exclusionary rule ... is not in doubt." 94 But Hudson made clear that
there are now four votes-Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito-to
completely eliminate the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases and
that it will continue to exist, or exceptions to it will be created, to the extent
that Justice Kennedy wants.
This was evident in 2009 when the Supreme Court significantly
changed the law of the exclusionary rule, again in a 5-4 decision with the
most conservative justices in the majority.9 6 The case, Herring v. United
States, is the most important change in the exclusionary rule since Mapp v.
Ohio applied it to the states in 1961.
Police in Coffee County, Florida, learned that Bennie Dean Herring
had driven there to pick up an impounded truck.
The officer knew
Herring and decided to check to see if there were any outstanding warrants
for him from other counties.99 The officer, Mack Anderson, found an
outstanding warrant from Dale County and went and arrested Herring based
on it. 00 Herring was searched incident to his arrest and methamphetamines

92. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 111
(2003) ("To conservatives, it is an absurd rule through which manifestly dangerous criminals are let out
because the courts prefer technicalities to truth.").
93. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597.
94. Id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
95. See id. Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito all voted with the majority to not apply the
exclusionary rule. See id.
96. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
97. See id.; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that "evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is .. . inadmissible in state court").
98. Herring,129 S. Ct. at 698.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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were found in his pocket.o'0 It turns out, though, that the warrant had been
lifted by the other county five months earlier; its computer system had just
not been updated. 102 Thus, Herring claimed that the arrest and the resulting
search were illegal.103 The issue was whether the exclusionary rule applies
when police commit an illegal search based on good faith reliance on
erroneous information from another jurisdiction.4
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that the
105 The Court once more said that the
exclusionary rule did not apply.
exclusionary rule is the "last resort" and is to be used only where its
application will have significant additional deterrent effect on police
misconduct.' 06 The Court ruled that the exclusionary rule may be used only
if there is an intentional or reckless violation of the Fourth Amendment or if
there are systemic police department violations with regard to searches and
seizures. 0 7 For the first time in history, the Court concluded that the
exclusionary rule does not apply if the Fourth Amendment is violated by
good faith or even negligent police actions.
The Court could have come to the same result in favor of the police in
a far narrower, more minimalist holding. In an earlier case, Arizona v.
rely
Evans, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply if police
09 The
court.'
a
in good faith on erroneous information about a warrant from
Court could have simply ruled that the same exception applies when the
police rely on erroneous information about a warrant from another
jurisdiction. Instead, the Court issued a sweeping rule that the exclusionary
rule never applies if the police violate the Fourth Amendment in good faith
or through negligence."10
Exempting all negligent violations of the Fourth Amendment from the
exclusionary rule is, in itself, a very significant undermining of this
protection. The reality is that many police violations of the Fourth
Amendment are the result of negligence and not "systemic error or reckless
disregard of constitutional requirements.""'
Chief Justice Roberts went even further and said that the exclusionary
rule applies only where the value in deterring police misconduct outweighs
2
the costs of releasing a potentially guilty person.1 Chief Justice Roberts

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 703-04.
See id. at 698.
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 2 (1995).
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701.
Id. at 704.
Id.

24

TEXAS TECH LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43:13

concluded that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the
justice system."' 3
In other words, the Court has created a major new exception to the
exclusionary rule. Instead of the rule being presumptively applicable for
almost all Fourth Amendment violations, the law now mandates that it will
apply only if it would deter the specific police misconduct at issue and only
if, on balance, the deterrence gained outweighs the costs of possibly guilty
people going free."14
There are significant problems with this erosion of the exclusionary
rule. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, "[t]he exclusionary rule, it
bears emphasis, is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth
Amendment violation."" 5 Rarely will a victim of a Fourth Amendment
violation, such as the one in Herring,be able to successfully sue the officers
for money damages.
Without the exclusionary rule, there is nothing to deter police
misconduct." 6 In the context of Herring, without the exclusionary rule,
there would be no reason at all for police to check to make sure that the
warrant for Herring was valid."'7 Police are very savvy about this, and they
will quickly learn when they can violate the Fourth Amendment with
impunity and no real consequences.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion errs in focusing on the
exclusionary rule solely in terms of police deterrence. As Justice Ginsburg
explains in her dissenting opinion:
But the rule also serves other important purposes: It "enabl[es] the
judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness," and it
"assur[es] the people-all potential victims of unlawful government
conduct-that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior,
thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government."" 8
To be sure, Herring v. United States does not eliminate the exclusionary
rule. But, it does erode it, and it makes clear that there is a majority on the
Court that wants to go very far in limiting it.' The exclusionary rule is not
new. The conservative members of the Court have always vocally opposed
it, and now they have a majority on the Supreme Court that will
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 702.
See id at 704.
Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
Id (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
See id at 704 (majority opinion).
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significantly undermine it. Herring v. United States is an unfortunate,
significant step in that direction.
Why does this matter? All of our privacy, not just the privacy of those
who have committed crimes, is protected by the Fourth Amendment, which
limits when the police can engage in searches or arrests. Without the
Fourth Amendment, there is nothing to keep the police from stopping and
searching any person, or searching anyone's home, anytime they want.
This surely would mean more effective law enforcement, but at a huge cost
in terms of privacy. The primary incentive for the police to comply with
the Fourth Amendment is their knowledge that violations will be counterproductive because illegally obtained evidence will be suppressed. The
Roberts Court's dramatic erosion of the exclusionary rule in its first few
years thus puts the privacy rights of all of us in jeopardy.
Yet, it would be a mistake to see the Roberts Court as conservative in
all areas of criminal procedure. In October Term 2009, the Court held that
it is cruel and unusual punishment to impose a sentence of life without the
120
possibility of parole for a non-homicide crime committed by a juvenile.
Also in that term, in three separate cases, the Court found ineffective
assistance of counsel.121
The most significant area in which the Roberts Court has ruled in favor
of criminal defendants is under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.12 2 In Crawfordv. Washington, the Rehnquist Court overruled
precedent and held that a prosecutor may not use testimonial statements
against a criminal defendant, even if they are reliable, unless there has been
23
the opportunity for cross-examination.1 Since then, the Roberts Court has
expanded the protections of Crawford, holding that a defendant does not
forfeit its safeguards even if he is responsible for the witness's absence and
that Crawford applies to laboratory analysts' reports such as those about the
24
nature and amount of drugs.1 Justice Scalia wrote the majority for all of
these decisions, expanding the rights of criminal defendants under the
25
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
V. THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY AND THE FUTURE
In his first two years, President Obama has had the chance to fill two
vacancies on the Court.126 In 2009, David Souter announced his resignation
120. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
121. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1498-87 (2010); Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct.
3259, 3267 (2010); Porter v. McCullum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452-53 (2009).
122. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
123. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
124. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542; Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
125. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530; Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681; Crawford,541 U.S. at 37.
126. See Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Picks Kagan as Justice Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2010, at Al.
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at the relatively young age (for a justice) of sixty-nine years old.127 He was
replaced by Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor.128 In her first term on
the Court, she was as consistently liberal as any justice, including in the
area of criminal procedure.129 Overall, she agreed with both Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer in 90% of the cases.130
In 2010, in fact on the day of the symposium at Texas Tech University
School of Law, Justice Stevens announced his resignation.13'
The
conventional wisdom is that his replacement, Elena Kagan, will vote in
most cases the same way that Stevens would have decided. There is really
no basis for this prediction in criminal procedure cases, however, since
Kagan had never been a judge before going to the Supreme Court and sher
academic writings did not touch on this area. Many speculate that Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg might retire during the first Obama term.132 In 2010,
she turned seventy-seven and is now the oldest member of the Court. 3
But, an Obama replacement is likely to be ideologically similar to
Ginsburg.
The other side of the ideological aisle is unlikely, absent unforeseen
circumstances, to provide a vacancy to Obama. John Roberts turned fiftyfive years old in 2010.134 If he remains on the Court until he is ninety years
old, Justice Stevens's age at retirement, Roberts will be Chief Justice until
the year 2045. Samuel Alito turned sixty on April 1, 2010.'13 Clarence
Thomas has been on the Supreme Court since 1991, but he is only sixty-two
years old.' 36 Both Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy turned seventyfour in 2010.1 It seems that the best predictor of a long life span is a seat
on the United States Supreme Court. The result is that Obama, even if he
serves two terms, is unlikely to replace Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
or Alito. This means that he will be unable, at least in the short-term, to
change the overall ideological composition of the Court.
My bottom line, then, in looking at the Roberts Court, now and for the
foreseeable future, is that it is overall a Court for conservatives to rejoice
127. Adam Liptak, Souter's Exit Opens Doorfor a More Influential Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May
8,
2009, at A14.
128. Jonathan Weisman, HispanicPickedfor Top Court,WALL ST. J., May 26,2009, at Al.
129. See Adam Liptak, A Year Later, "Roberts Court" Has Emerged, PITSBURG POST-GAZETTE,
July 4, 2010, at A6.
130. See id
131. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens's Retirement is a PoliticalTest
for Obama,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at Al.
132. See Paul Bedard, Ginsburg Retirement Would Give Obama Another Nominee, U.S.
NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, July 20, 2010, availableat 2010 WLNR 14541086.
133. See Joan Biskupic, Reshaped Supreme Court Charts New Era, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2010,
at
4A.
134. See id
135. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies/aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
136. See id
137. See id
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over. Justice Kennedy sides with the conservatives more than twice as
often as with the liberals. As for liberals, perhaps they should be glad that
the Court is deciding only about seventy-three or sixty-seven cases a year.

